Normative and Educational Ethics :: Philosophy Morals Papers

The controversies in our time between teleological and deontological ethics which come down to the problem "from being to ought," referring to human being or nature, can be resolved only by an adequate conception of human nature. Taking up the ancient tradition (Plato, Aristotle, Stoa) again, we can re-examine the teleological conception of human nature as primarily instinctive and selfish, and say that human nature is constituted also by reason and that the instinctive nature is predisposed to be guided by reason or intellect. The constitutive order of the human soul, with the subordination of the instinct under the intellect, involves already some natural goodness, of which the intellect is aware (in the natural moral conscience) and for which the will strives (in a natural inclination). This is the basis for the "moral law" and for normative ethics. Thus, human nature is not selfish in itself. Although moral goodness as humankind’s perfection is an ideal, it has in us alrea dy imperfect natural beginnings, a "natural morality." In a certain sense, the moral ought of actions comes from one’s being, from the natural moral goodness of which the intellect is aware in itself, and from its good intentions. I. Problems of Foundation Seen historically, the foundation problems of ethical norms and normative ethics have been treated, in modern times, in two opposite directions, the empiricist and the rationalistic way. The former is characterized as the aposterioric way, taking the criterion of morality only from the result of experience — feelings of usefulness and happiness —, in contrast to the latter as aprioric, taking the criterion from a law of reason — universal human duties — foregoing to all experience. Kants’ ethics tried to superate the aposterioric ethics of the English empiricists, claiming, with the rationalists, a law of reason apriori, but in doing so he did not follow the way of pure rationalism. Rather he established his position as a combination of both directions, the empiricist and the rationalistic one. They form the so-called "material" and "formal" side of his ethics. The moral law of reason, the famous "categorical imperative", belongs to the formal side, whereas the objects of our actions are considered as "material", i.e. as objects of our sensitive desire or vital needs which can be given only in the field of sensible intuition. He denies with the empiricists any intellectual intuition and formulates the "paradox of method" (1) that no object or "good" can be the criterion a priori for morality, but only the categorical imperative, of which, if applied to actions, every object or good is a consequence.